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In the Supreme Court of the
State of lJtah
JOSEPH M. PERKINS and
ESTHER J. PERKINS,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
RICHARD L. SPENCER and
GRACE N. SPENCER,
Defendants and Respondents.

)
,'
!

CASE
NO. 7565

)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
To plaintiffs' and appellants' Statement of Facts should
be added the following additional statement:
The contract attached Exhibit "A" carries the following provision:
"THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this 18th
day of May, A.D., 1949, by and between Richard L.
Spencer and Grace N. Spencer, his wife, hereinafter
designated as the Seller, and Joseph M. Perkins and
Esther J. Perkins, his wife, as joint tenants according
to the rules of the common law and not as tenants in
common, and to the survivor of such, hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of Provo, Utah . . . . ."
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The contract attached Exhibit "A" is signed by Richard L. Spencer, Grace N. Spencer, as sellers, and Joseph
M. Perkins and Esther J. Perkins as buyers.
The contract attached Exhibit "A" carries the following provision:
"It is understood between the parties, however,
that the entire balance shall become due and payable
when the home presently owned by Joseph M. Perkins
and Esther J. Perkins, his wife, located in Bountiful,
Utah, is sold."
The property sold under the contract constituted the
home of defendants and respondents, and at the time of
the negotiations and the making of the contract, the defendants and respondents occupied the premises as their
home. The plaintiffs and appellants knew of this fact and
understood that the defendants and respondents would have
to procure another home for themselves. The defendants
and respondents purchased another home and made a payment of $5,619.67 and assumed a first mortgage indebtedness in the amount of $4,376.83, payable at the rate of
$47.50 per month. They moved from the property in question to their new purchase on or about June 1, 1949. (Memorandum Decision, Pages 1 and 2).
The last payment made by the plaintiffs and appellants
was on date of August 25, 1949, and the Bountiful property
was sold about September 17, 1949. The plaintiffs' and app2llants' application for an F. H. A. loan through the First
Se2urity Bank of Provo had been accepted so that as of the
date when the sale was to have been consummated, the
plaintiffs and appellants, by virtue of what had been paid
in and what had been received by the sale of the Bountiful
property and the approved F. H. A. loan, had an amount
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more than sufficient to satisfy the demands of the contract, but plaintiffs and appellants failed to make any payment to the defendants and respondents after the sale of
the Bountiful property, nor did they vacate the property.
(Memorandum Decision, Pages 2 and 3).
The notice of November 3, 1949, was served on both
of the plaintiffs and appellants and notified them that they
were delinquent upon their contract in the amount of the
balance due of $7,940.10, and that unless they paid the delinquency within five days, "the undersigned, in accordance
with the terms and conditions of said contract, shall be
released from all obligations in law and equity, to convey
the said property, and all payments which have been made
by you heretofore on said contract to the undersigned, shall
be forfeited to the undersigned as liquidated damages for
the non-performance of the said contract and you will thereupon become forthwith tenants at will of the undersigned
and action will be commenced against you for recovery of
the immediate possession of said premises." (Memorandum
Decision, Page 3).
That at the time of the service of the notice of November 9, 1949, upon Esther J. Perkins, the plaintiff,
Joseph M. Perkins, was not at home, but was working in
Carbon County. (Memorandum Decision, Page 4).

ARGUMENT
Counsel for plaintiffs and appellants, in their brief, has
set up under the heading of "Plaintiffs' Points," (page 4
of Appellants' Brief) , two principal grounds. The issues
raised by the statements of plaintiffs' and appellants'
points are as follows:
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Point I

Did the trial court err in assessing $532.50 damages by
reason of the unlawful detainer of the said Esther J. Perkins
and in holding the plaintiff, Esther J. Perkins, guilty of
unlawful detainer?
Point II

Did the trial court err in holding the forfeiture provision of the contract was not a penalty?
POINT I
DID THE TRIAL COiURT ERR IN ASSESSING
$532.50 DAMAGE BY REASON OF THE UNLAWF1JL
DETAINER OF THE SAID ESTHER J. PERKINS AND
IN HOLDING THE PLAINTIFF, ESTHER J. PERKINS,
GUILTY OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER?

Counsel for plaintiffs and appellants assumes that the
only tenant is Joseph M. Perkins and from this, reasons
that the only one who could be guilty of unlawful detainer
would be Joseph M. Perkins. The point is overlooked that
Esther J. Perkins was also a tenant at will and that she
was properly notified to vacate the premises and the judgment is for damages as to her unlawful detainer. The
question here is not that of damages as against Joseph M.
Perkins, but is a question of damages as to tenant Esther J.
Perkins.
The contract runs in favor of Joseph M. Perkins and
Esther J. Perkins and is signed by Joseph M. Perkins and
Esther, J. Perkins as buyers. (See Contract, Exhibit "A").
48 Corpus Juris Secundum, page 927, paragraph 4, contains the following statement:
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"A joint tenancy may be terminated or severed by
any act which destroys one or more of its unities. Thus
a joint tenancy may be severed by the act of one or
less than all of the co-tenants in conveying or otherwise disposing of their interests, as this destroys the
unity of title and creates a severance as to such interests, as where one joint tenant assigns, mortgages or
pledges, or leases his interest."
Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, 54 P2d 73, 11 Cal. App. 2d,
451 states:
"An estate in joint tenancy can be severed by de ..
straying one or more of the necessary unities, either
by operation of law, by death, by voluntary or certain
involuntary acts of the joint tenants, or by certain acts
or omissions of one joint tenant without the consent
of the other."
Here the two tenants had violated the provisions of
their contract and had been notified that their rights under
the contract were forfeited and that henceforth they would
be treated as tenants at will.
The notice that was later served on Esther J. Perkins,
demanding possession of the premises, did, after the lapse
of the five-day period, serve to sever the tenancy and it
would seem to follow that when Esther J. Perkins remained
in possession, that an action for unlawful detainer against
her would be good even though such an action might not
lie as against other persons.
Counsel for plaintiffs and appellants argues that, the
failure of tenant, Esther J. Perkins, to move out of the
house did not cause the Spencers any damage. The facts
show that Esther J. Perkins was in actual possession and
that plaintiff, Joseph M. Perkins, was not at home, but
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was working in another county. The argument assumes
that Joseph M. Perkins was staying in possession, but ac- ·
tually he was in another county.
32 American Jurisprudence, page 778, paragraph 918,
contains the following language:
"Since a tenant is under duty, it being a covenant
express or implied in all leases, to deliver up the premises to the landlord on the termination of a lease, the
tenant can hold over rightfully only pursuant to a
valid agreement with the landlord. Holding over by
the tenant without such agreement of the landlord puts
the tenant in the position of being in wrongful possession against the landlord. He is a wrongdoer."
The tenant, Esther J. Perkins, by her holding possession after the lapse of the time set forth in the notice of
November 9, 1949, is a wrongdoer. Her liability for damages as a result of her wrongful act is not affected by the
fact that there may be other wrongdoers. As far as is
apparent to the defendants and respondents, she is the
only one in physical possession. Certainly, it can be assumed that as soon as Esther J. Perkins was ousted from
possession, her joint tenant would have no desire to remain
in possession, especially when he was not physically present.
The measure of damages set out by Forrester v. Cook,
292 P. 206, 77 Utah 137, is the rental value of the land,
not as rent, but as damages which, under the unlawful
detainer statute, is multifplied by three. Esther J. Perkins,
by virtue of her interest in the contract and her retention
of possession after due and proper notice, is an unlawful
detainer and it would seem to follow that the application
of the unlawful detainer statute, U. C. A., 1943, Title 104-
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60-13, and the principles set out in Forrester v. Cook, 292
P. 206, 77 Utah 137, would require a finding of damages
in the amount of $532.50 as against Esther J. Perkins.
POINT II

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN HOLDING THE
FORFEITURE PROVISION OF THE CONTRACT WAS
NOT A PENALTY?

The Courts, in determining whether a provision in a
contract is one calling for damages or a penalty, have reasoned on the basis set out in the following statements of
the law:
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, page 819,
Section 440, answers the query as follows:
"The question whether a sum thus stipulated to
be paid is a penalty or is liquidated damages, is often
difficult to determine. It depends, however, upon a

construction of the whole instrument, upon the real
intention of the parties as ascertained from all the language which they have used, from the nature of the act
to be performed or not to be performed, from the consequences which naturally result from a violation of
the contract, and from the circumstances generally
surrounding the transaction."
Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Vol. 3, Sec.
777, page 2185-6, on question of intention, states:
"Probably all that most Courts mean-at any rate
all that can be defended-is to say that the validity of
the stipulation is to be 'judged of as at the time of
making of the contract, not as at the time of the
breach,' and this is undoubtedly true."
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Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Vol. 3, Sec.
783, page 2203-4, notes:
"Though the mere fact that, as it turns out, the
sum named exceeds the actual damage will not make
it a penalty, since the reasonableness of the provision
must be considered as of the date of the contract. ... "
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, Sec. 385, page
714, states:
"The meaning is that whatever be the nature of the
controversy between two definite parties, and whatever
be the nature of the remedy demanded, the Court will
not confer its equitable relief upon the parties seeking
its interposition and aid, unless he has acknowledged
and conceded, or will admit and provide for all the
equitable rights, claims and demands justly belonging
to the adversary party, and growing out of or necessarily involved in the subject matter of the controversy."
A consideration of the cases, including those relied on
by counsel for the plaintiffs and appellants, indicates that
what we have here is a damage provision and not one for
a penalty.
Counsel for plaintiffs and appellants, in an effort to
sustain Point Two, relies in the main on the cases of Dopp
v. Richards, 43 U. 332, 135 P. 98, Western Macaroni Mfg.
v. Fiore, 47 U. 108, 151 P. 984, Cooley v. Call, _ _u. __ ,
211 P. 977, and Croft v. Jensen, 86 U. 13, 40 P2d 198.
A reading of the case of Dopp v. Richards, 43 U. 332,
135 P. 98, shows facts which are in no way applicable to
the facts in the present case. Plaintiff, in that case, sought
to recover damages commensurate with his claimed loss in
addition to the payments that had actually been made,
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notwithstanding the provision in the contract providing that
the vendees should forfeit to the vendors as liquidated
damages, all payments that had been made on the agreement. The Utah Supreme Court, in that case, held that
the provision for liquidated damages of the amounts paid
limited any recovery which plaintiff might have to amounts
actually paid, even though it might be far less than the
actual damages.
Counsel for plaintiffs and appellants places considerable reliance on the case of Western Macaroni Mfg. v. Fiore,
47 U. 108, 151 P. 984. We submit that the principles set
out in this case have no application to the instant case. In
the Western Macaroni Mfg. v. Fiore case, the covenants
were of equal importance and covered unrelated subject
matter. There are numerous cases dealing with the type
of contract that we have in the instant case, but in none
of these cases does he Court apply the reasoning of the
Western Macaroni case. The Cooley v. Call, __u._,
211 P. 977, case involved a contract containing different
covenants. In fact, one of the covenants in the Cooley v.
Call case was for the payment of taxes and assessments,
and one for payments on purchase price, just as two of the
covenants in the instant case are to pay taxes and assessments and payments on purchase price. The Court in the
Cooley v. Call case reasoned that the intent of the parties
was that the provision was one for liquidated damages.
We submit the same reasoning would apply here. In the
instant case, the paramount covenant is one of payment.
The different covenants referred to by the buyer all tie
in to the main covenant of payment.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
The principal is well stated in Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Volume 1, in the note under Section 443, at pages
842 and 843 as follows:
"The mere fact, however, that an agreement contains two or more provisions differing in kind and importance does not of itself necessarily bring it within
the operation of this rule. If the various acts stipulated to be done are but minor parts of one single
whole-steps in the accomplishment of one single end
-so that the contract is in reality one, then it may
properly come under the operation of the second rule
as given in the text."
The second rule as given in the text is found in Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Volume 1, Section 442 at page
829:
"Second. Where an agreement is for the performance or non-performance of only one act, and there is
no adequate means of ascertaining the precise damage
which may result from a violation, the parties may,
if they please, by a separate clause of the contract,
fix upon the amount of compensation payable by the
defaulting party in case of a breach; and a stipulation
inserted for such purpose will be treated as one for
liquidated damages unless the intent be clear that it
was designed to be only a penalty."
In the case of Cooley v. Call, __u. __ , 211 P. 977,
the contract price was $8,450.00, payable as follows:
$1,850.00 upon execution of the contract; $1,000.00 December 1, 1920; $1,000.00 December 1, 1921, and the assumption of two mortgages aggregating $4,600.00, and agreement to pay taxes thereafter levied. The Court found that
the buyers had paid $2,130.00, or approximately 25.2% of
the purchase price. The action, in that case, was brought

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
by the sellers of the land, seeking specific performance of
the contract. The Court held that the forfeiture provision
was intended by the parties as one for liquidated damages
and so denied the right of the owners to specific performance.
We submit that on the basis of the test used in the
case of Cooley v. Call, _u._, 211 P. 977, the percent
of payment is approximately the same as in our instant
case, and that the reasoning of the Court as to the length
of time before final payment would be made, would apply
with equal force in the instant case.
In the instant case, the time of the final payment was
indefinite, in that it was to be paid when the Bountiful
property was sold. It could be years before this payment
would have been due so that the Court could very well
find that the provision as to liquidated damages was certainly intended by the parties as liquidated damages.
There is another fact in the instant case that does not
appear in the Cooley v. Call case, and that is that it was
known to the plaintiffs and appellants, as buyers, that the
defendants and respondents would have to procure another
home for themselves before the plaintiffs and appellants
could take possession. In order to obtain a home for thern··
selves, the defendants and respondents purchased property
by paying $5,619.67 and by assuming a first mortgage illdebtedness upon the property in the sum of $4,376.83, payable at the rate of $47.50 per month. They moved frorn
the property in question to their new purchase on or about
June 1, 1949. In other words, the defendants and respondents gave up the home they were living in, obligated
themselves on a contract and assumed a further mortgage
obligation. They did not contemplate being placed in a
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~andlord-tenant relationship at the time of the execution
of the contract, so that it can be said in this case, as the
Supreme Court said in the Cooley v. Call case, t~1at the
obvious intention of the parties, considered in the light of
what the parties must have foreseen and contemplated at
the time the contract was executed, was that the provision
was one for liquidated damages.
The facts in the case of Croft v. Jensen, 86 U. 13, 40
P2d 198, are clearly inapplicable to the facts in the instant
case. The sale price of the property involved in the Croft
v. Jensen case was $6,500.00. A down payment was made
of $4,200.00, represented by $200.0 cash and property conveyed to vendor valued at $4,000.00. The contract contained a clause similar to the clause in the present case.
The facts of that case disclose that on July 17, 1925, the
plaintiffs served a written notice on the defendant, Jensen,
informing him that plaintiffs had terminated the contract
for the sale of the property. A similar notice was sent by
registered mail on the same day to defendant I. G. Bench.
The sum of $200.00 remained unpaid at the time. A few
days after the notice was given I. G. Bench, he tendered to
the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs' attorney the sum of $200.00
and demanded a deed to the property. The tender of the
payment of $200.00 was refused.
The facts further show that at the trial the defendant
again tendered the balance in the amount of $200.00. The
Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Croft v. Jensen, made
this observation:

"It will be observed that at the time the plaintiff
attempted to declare a forfeiture, she had been paid
the whole of the purchase price of the property except
$200.00, which sum was tendered to her and was by
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her refused prior to the time she commenced this action." (Bottom of page 201 and top of page 202, 40
P2d 198)
The Court further observed:
"To permit plaintiff to retain $6,300.00 as liquidated damages because she was not promptly paid two
installments when there was only $200.00 remaining
unpaid on the contract, is not in accord with equity
and good conscience, but is clearly unconscienable."
(Bottom of page 202 under Sub-head 3, 40 P2d 198)
The facts in the instant case are not at all similar to
the Croft v. Jensen case. In the instant case, plaintiffs
and appellants paid the down payment of $2,500.00 and
three of the $75.00 per month installments, making a total
paid by them of $2,725.00, or approximately 25.9% of the
purchase price. At the time of the execution of the contract, the amount paid down was 23.8% of the purchase
price. In the Croft v. Jensen case, the amount paid in at
the time of the forfeiture, was in excess of 96% and the
amount paid at the time of the execution of the contract
was 64.4~ of the pruchase price.
In the case now before the Court, there is no evidence
that there was ever a tender of payment made by the
buyers. In the Croft v. Jensen case, tender of payment
was made repeatedly. Further, in the instant case, the
facts show that the sellers, the respondents herein, in their
notice of November 3, 1949, gave the buyers an opportunity to pay the delinquency within five days. Payment
was not made. In the Croft v. Jensen case, there was
never any offer permitting the buyers to pay up the delinquency. ·
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The Courts quite frequently, as the Court did in the
Croft v. Jensen case, state that whether an agreement ls
for liquidated damages or for penalty must be determined
by a consideration of the circumstances surrounding the
parties at the time of its execution. However, it is submitted that the Court in its decision in the Croft v. Jensen
case, based its decision on the lack of equity in the case
as shown by the Court's statement as follows:
"To permit plaintiff to retain $6,300.00 as liquidated damages because she was not promptly paid two
installments when there was only $200.00 remaining
unpaid on the contract, is not in accord with equity
and good conscience, but is clearly unconscienable."
(Bottom of page 202 under Sub-head 3, 40 P2d 198)
In the case of Franz v. Hair, 76 U. 281, 289 P. 130,
the down payment on the purchase price was in excess of
30%. The Court did not treat it as a penalty. In the
instant case, payment made was approximately 25.9% and
the buyer was in possession of the premises for eight
months, the last five months of which no payment was
made.
The reasoning of the Croft v. Jensen case was followed
in Rayfield v. Van Meter, 52 P. 666, an action to replevy
furniture sold to defendant. Sale price, $1830.00; $1,000.00
down payment, balance $850.00 not paid. Claim of fraud.
The Court said: (See page 667, 52 P. 666)
"It is contended that in equity the defendant should
recover the sum paid less a proper compensation for
the use had by him of the goods. But the grounds for
equitable relief against the contract pleaded by the
defendant were found against him by the Court and
he stands in the position of one who wilfully refused

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

J
<(

I

15
to comply with his agreement. It seems to us that
there is little equity and certainly no sound policy in
allowing a buyer, under such circumstances, to be at
pleasure to quit his contract with no other liability
than such as the law would have implied had there
been no express contract at all."
In the instant case, defendants and respondents never
interfered with the contract. Plaintiffs and appellants quit.
There was nothing in the agreement that was harsh. The
price was fair. Plaintiffs and appellants occupied the premises for eight months, the last five without making any payments. Payment has not been tendered and this is so even
after plaintiffs and appellants were given an opportunity
to make payment. No payment was made even after the
Bountiful property was sold. Defendants and respondents,
in reliance on sale, purchased other property and obligated
themselves.
From the foregoing facts, in the instant case the equities certainly seem to be with the defendants and respondents.
We respectfully submit that under the principles set
forth in the cases adjudicated by the Utah Supreme Court
and other courts, the trial court did not err:

(1) In assessing $532.50 damages by reason of the unlawful detainer of the said Esther J. Perkins and in holding
the plaintiff Esther J. Perkins guilty of unlawful detainer;
and
(2)In holding the forfeiture provision of the contract
was not a penalty.
Respectfully submitted,
HUGH VERN \VENTZ,
Attorney for Defendants
and Respondents
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